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SOLIDARITY OR COLONIALISM? THE POLEMIC
OF “LABOR COLONIALISM” IN PUERTO RICO
César F. Rosado Marzán
Leaders of American-based labor organizations in Puerto Rico aggressively supported a collective bargaining
rights bill for public sector workers in 1998 because, so they argued, the new law would help organize the
public sector. However, almost ten years after the approval of that bill, it has become patently clear that the
law did not lead to new organizing in Puerto Rico. Rather, the law changed the institutional makeup of labor
relations in Puerto Rico by providing American-based labor organizations an opportunity to raid existing
Puerto Rican labor organizations and become the exclusive representatives of public sector workers. Therefore, since the law was approved, a war between some American-based unions and some Puerto Rico-based
labor organizations has ensued, one where the Puerto Rican unions accuse U.S. unions of being “labor
colonialists,” while American-based labor unions deny the accusations and label their critics as ultra leftists,
splintering the labor movement and making it an ineffective defender of working class interests. Hence, the
new law, far from delivering the hundreds of thousands of new union members that union leaders promised,
has created a political nightmare for labor organizations in Puerto Rico. U.S. labor unions are at fault for
contributing to the current divisions in the Puerto Rican labor movement, but all unions, including
independent Puerto Rican unions, must ﬁnd a way out of the deadlock to concentrate on their most important
goal—represent their members and become effective leaders for the Puerto Rican working class.

As the year 1998 began, the Puerto Rican press ran headlines that a new
“unionization” bill for public sector workers, ofﬁcially called Law 45 of 1998, the
Labor Relations Act for the Public Service (hereinafter referred to as “Law 45”)
was about to be approved by the Puerto Rican legislature and supported by an
alliance of American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations
unions.1 The newspaper headlines read: “Rosselló2 signs unionization bill into
law” (Gerard Delfín 1998), “Business leaders afraid of the impact of unionization” (Belaval Díaz 1998), “PDP lawmakers face ouster on unionization bill”3
(Associated Press 1998). A prominent political analyst ran a column in those days
titled, simply, “Unionization” (Rigau 1998).
A couple of years later, José La Luz, leader of the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) local in Puerto Rico, Servidores Públicos Unidos (SPU)-AFSCME, alleged in the pages of this journal that
the new law would help unions organize more than 150,000 new workers in
Puerto Rico (Luz and Ness 2000). A Service Employees International Union
(SEIU) leader similarly told the Puerto Rican press in 2005 that the new law
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helped organize more than 100,000 workers (Serrano 2005). In fact, he stated
that, “There are no comparable numbers in Puerto Rico or any other place
where 100,000 workers have been organized in three years.”
However, the new law did not lead to any signiﬁcant new organizing. Rather,
as this article will detail, the law merely changed the legal framework of public
sector unions. It provided exclusive representation rights to labor organizations
that represent workers of the traditional government agencies of Puerto Rico4
but took away workers’ right to strike. The law also provided an opportunity for
some unions, mainly U.S.-based, “International unions,” to raid Puerto Rican,
independent unions, known as the “bona ﬁde associations,” which since the
1960s had already organized the public sector of Puerto Rico. Raiding led to
political conﬂicts between several American-based unions and Puerto Ricanbased labor organizations, weakening the labor union movement. Hence, the
new labor law backed by American-based labor unions, far from organizing new
workers and strengthening collective bargaining, led to sharp divisions in the
labor union movement that, as we will see in these pages, weakened unionism in
Puerto Rico and placed it in a political deadlock.
Puerto Rico’s Unions
Puerto Rico was a Spanish colony from the late 1400s until 1898, when the
U.S. acquired it as war booty in the Spanish-American war. Puerto Rico has
remained a U.S. “territory” since, meaning that it has remained under the
plenary powers of the U.S. Congress.
The “Commonwealth” of Puerto Rico was ofﬁcially established in 1952. It
has an elected legislative branch with two houses, a senate and a house of
representatives, an elected executive and a judiciary branch that is appointed by
the governor of Puerto Rico and conﬁrmed by the Puerto Rican senate.
However, different from Americans living in the U.S. states, Puerto Ricans
cannot vote for federal parliamentarians or for the President of the U.S. All
federal laws that are not “locally inapplicable” are extended to Puerto Rico by
the U.S. Congress, which, in practice, means that almost all federal laws apply to
Puerto Rico. In the labor relations ﬁeld, this has meant that the federal National
Labor Relations Act applies to Puerto Rico, as other labor laws and regulations.
Federalism for Puerto Rico has also meant that, as U.S. states, Puerto Rico can
legislate over those affairs where federal laws do not apply, such as for labor
relations in Puerto Rican government agencies.
The modern labor union movement in Puerto Rico began in the nineteenth
century as an agglomeration of artisan clubs and societies. The activities of these
organizations were mostly illegal under Spanish law, especially when they struck
(Galvin 1979; Gervasio and Quintero Rivera 1984, 25, chap. 1). An open and
legal labor movement did not begin in Puerto Rico until Samuel Gompers’ AFL
aggressively lobbied the U.S. government to abolish the Spanish criminal code
soon after the American invasion. Gompers also heartily supported Santiago
Iglesias Pantín, one of the most recognized labor leaders in Puerto Rico, to
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organize the Federación Libre de Trabajadores (FLT). The reason for Gompers’
support of the FLT was not totally altruistic, however. Gompers’ main interest
regarding Puerto Rico was based on American nativism; Gompers wanted
unions to increase wages in Puerto Rico to curb emigration ﬂows to the U.S.
mainland. Of further concern to Gompers was that Puerto Rican migrants, as
immigrant workers coming into the U.S., could contribute to the swelling ranks
of rival and more militant unions organizing immigrant labor in the U.S., such
as the Knights of Labor, the Socialist Workers Party, the Social Democratic
Party, and the Industrial Workers of the World (Galvin 1979, 56; Gervasio and
Quintero Rivera 1984, 37–39).
Yet, even though the FLT afﬁliated with the AFL, the FLT, organized on the
ground by cadres inspired by Spanish anarchism and European socialism, did
not subscribe entirely to the AFL’s business unionism orientation. In 1915,
deviating from the Gompers doctrine of not organizing workers’ own political
party, the FLT organized the Partido Socialista, or Socialist Party, which became
one of the most important political parties in Puerto Rico until its demise in the
1930s. Since its beginnings, the Socialist Party won elections in many towns
where the concentration of wageworkers was high. Its political impact was so
swift and apparently powerful that the Creole bourgeoisie united in one party for
the elections of 1924 to ward off a possible triumph of the Socialist Party
(Gervasio and Quintero Rivera 1984, chap. 5).
Albeit its triumph at the municipal levels, the Socialist Party was unable to win
an electoral majority in the general elections of Puerto Rico. By 1932, it turned to
the Right, leaving its radicalism behind, to form an electoral alliance with the
party of the sugar trusts and the Creole bourgeoisie, the Partido Republicano, or
Republican Party. The Socialist Party leaders justiﬁed their alliance with their
historical class enemies under the guise that they could negotiate the ﬁrst
industry-wide collective bargaining contract for sugarcane workers if they formed
such an alliance. The Socialist and Republican parties also supported Puerto
Rican statehood—to make Puerto Rico a U.S. federated state—which gave them
further political grounds to unite (Galvin 1979, chap. 6; Gervasio and Quintero
Rivera 1984, chap. 5; Taller de Formación Política 1982).
The Republican–Socialist alliance led to a victory in the elections of 1932.
However, in the sugarcane ﬁelds, the Socialist Party and FLT leaders could not
negotiate the wage increase that the Puerto Rican workers would approve, and
the workers led a wildcat strike against the government, their union leaders, and
the employers. The workers also called on Pedro Albizu Campos, leader of the
Nationalist Party, an avid anti-imperialist political party, to lead their strike.
Albizu Campos accepted the workers’ invitation and helped the workers to
negotiate a contract that was approved in mass assemblies, to the embarrassment
of the FLT and Socialist Party ofﬁcialdom. After that strike, however, Albizu
Campus did not continue to lead the workers, as he did not, in his words,
recognize himself to be a “labor leader” (Taller de Formación Política 1982).
Industrial unionism inspired by the CIO model began to take form in the
second half of the 1930s in Puerto Rico, which led to the creation of the Central
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General de Trabajadores (CGT). FLT detractors and leaders of the Communist
Party of Puerto Rico helped in its foundation. It led important strikes in the
transportation and dock industries (Gervasio and Quintero Rivera 1984, 116–25;
Galvin 1979, 94–101).
By 1944, populism also began to take a strong hold in Puerto Rican politics
through the organization of the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD), a party
that promised, with its quasi-Bolshevik slogan, “bread, land, and liberty,” a new
era for Puerto Rico. The party began to promote New Deal-type programs and
to craft the Commonwealth status for Puerto Rico. The PDP, with the support
of the populist wing of the CGT and over 60 percent of the Puerto Rican
electorate, proceeded to win elections from the 1940s until 1968. However, the
party expected from all its allies, including the CGT, extreme loyalty. As a result,
independent unionism came to an end and a quasi-corporatist labor relations
regime crystallized in Puerto Rico.
The PDP’s golden era ended in 1968, when it lost its ﬁrst election to the
newly formed, pro-statehood party, the Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP). Since
1968, the PDP has lost many elections to the pro-statehood PNP, leading to a
bipartisan political system that resembles that of the U.S. Unions not only
became more independent, but also began to lose membership, especially in the
private sector, dwindling in efﬁcacy and even relevance in the Puerto Rican
political economy.

Union Membership in Puerto Rico
Union density in Puerto Rico has been declining since about 1970, with the
exception of the years between 1996 and 2000, when labor union density rose
from 6 to 10 percent (Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources
[several years]). However, labor union membership numbers do not account for
all labor organization membership in Puerto Rico. In Puerto Rico, the Department of Labor and Human Resources (Department of Labor) collects two types
of union membership numbers. The ﬁrst, “labor union membership,” accounts
for the membership of labor organizations with the statutory right to bargain
collectively with an employer. The Department of Labor also collects a second
type of union membership number—“labor organization membership”—which
includes all members of labor organizations, regardless of whether or not the
organization has the statutory right to bargain collectively with the employer.
The Department of Labor has been compelled to collect these two different
kinds of data because in Puerto Rico there have been thousands of workers
organized by “bonaﬁde” and/or other workers’ “associations” (hereinafter called
“bonaﬁde associations”) that have not been sanctioned by law as the exclusive
representative of the workers, or that management has had to legally “bargain in
good faith,” but that have nevertheless represented workers, led job actions,
struck, and even signed collective bargaining agreements with management as a
result of their militancy.
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The percentage of workers who have been members of “labor organizations”
and “labor unions” in Puerto Rico’s public sector from 1996 to 2002 are contained in Figure 1. As we can see in Figure 1, the percentage of employees of
Puerto Rico’s public sector who were members of “labor organizations” has
been much higher than the percentage of workers who have been members of
“labor unions.” While less than 5 percent of workers of the public sector were
members of “labor unions” in 1996, before Law 45 was approved, the percentage
of “labor organization” members was almost 30 percent in the same year. In
2002, even though about the same percentage of workers remain members of
a “labor organization,” or about 35 percent, the percentage of “labor union”
members increased to over 25 percent. Hence, the new law signiﬁcantly
increased the membership of “labor union” membership rates, albeit not general
“labor organization” membership rates.
The absolute numbers of “labor organization” members and “labor union”
members, as detailed in Table 1, can help us understand more speciﬁcally
what has been the true impact of Law 45 on union membership. As Table 1

40%
35%
30%
25%
Percent 20%

"Labor Union"
"Labor Organization"

15%
10%
5%
0%
1994

1996

2000

2002

Year

Figure 1. “Labor Union” and “Labor Organization” Membership in Puerto Rico’s, Public Sector.
Adapted from PR Department of Labor and Human Resources (various years).

Table 1. Breakdown of Union Membership in Puerto Ricoa
Year

All

“Union”

%

“Bona ﬁde”

%

1996
2002
2005

139,000
140,000
141,000

69,000
113,000
122,000

50
81
87

69,000
27,000
17,000

50
19
12

Adopted from the PR Department of Labor and Human Resources
(various years).
a
Totals may not add precisely due to rounding of numbers to the nearest
thousand.
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shows, there were about 139,000 “labor organization” members in
Puerto Rico in 1996.5 By 2005, the absolute numbers of “labor organization”
members increased only marginally, to about 141,000. However, during
the same period, the number of “labor union” members increased, while
bona ﬁde association membership decreased. While there were about the
same amount of “labor union” and bona ﬁde association members in 1996—
about 69,000 for each type of labor organization—by 2005 union membership rolls increased to 122,000 members, while bona ﬁde association membership decreased to a dismal 17,000 members. Therefore, Law 45 did not lead
to massive, new organizing. Rather, the law changed the legal form of
labor organization membership in the traditional government agencies.
Labor organizations with the exclusive right to bargain for workers replaced
bona ﬁde associations, which had attained some limited collective bargaining
rights at the margins of the law and through militancy. As will be described
below, this effect on labor membership led to sharp conﬂicts that last to this
day between the losing and winning labor organizations involved in this
process.

The Politics of Law 45 of 1998
In the 1990s, the labor movement in the U.S. admitted that it was in dire
straits given that union density rates were dropping to close to 10 percent, the
lowest numbers of union membership since the Depression. The election of
John Sweeney to the helm of the AFL–CIO brought hopes that labor could
organize new workers and save the labor movement from irrelevancy. Americanbased labor organizations, among them, AFSCME, began to ﬁnd ways to
increase their numbers by organizing workers everywhere and anywhere possible, including Puerto Rico. Because Puerto Rico had not yet granted collective
bargaining rights to workers of the traditional government agencies or provided
a labor relations system to those workers that resembled legitimate unionism in
the U.S.—one with exclusive representation rights—Puerto Rico was deemed
open for American-based labor organizations to intervene, add members to its
rolls, and, of course, harvest union dues.
Not only were AFSCME and other American-based unions in favor of a
collective bargaining rights bill—among them the SEIU—but the government
of Puerto Rico had become interested in negotiating such a bill with the labor
unions as long as it guaranteed that it would promote amicable labor relations.
As the governor told me in an interview:
I started to look at this not as an issue of a collision between irreconcilable
forces, but of giving a right to unionize that had components to force the
process through mechanisms of resolution, instead of confrontation, that it
could be something positive rather than negative. (Roselló Gonzalez, interview
by author, Washington, DC, 2002)

CÉSAR F. ROSADO MARZÁN: SOLIDARITY OR COLONIALISM?

293

Thus, the Governor was open to the idea of approving a public sector, collective
bargaining rights bill to curb militancy.
By 1994, AFSCME began to support a number of political candidates for the
Puerto Rican legislature, including Charlie Rodriguez, of the PNP, who became
Senate President, among others, creating a political base for a new collective
bargaining rights bill if the PNP was reelected. Also, a political deal between the
Rosselló camp and AFSCME was struck, where the union would help the PNP
to lobby for what came to be known as the “Young Bill,” a U.S. Congressional
bill that would have given Puerto Ricans the option to vote in a federally
prescribed referendum for the different status options for Puerto Rico—
statehood, independence, the Commonwealth (status quo) and an “associated
republic” (free association). Until then, the U.S. Congress had never authorized
status referenda in Puerto Rico. Rather, the Puerto Rican government had run
its own, nonbinding referenda. The PNP, being a pro-statehood party, wanted a
federal bill passed by the U.S. Congress so that Puerto Ricans could vote in a
binding plebiscite, especially if the result ended with a triumph for the statehood
option. Since Rosselló knew that getting the bill passed by the U.S. Congress
was going to be difﬁcult, his ties with the North American unions and their
lobbying machines made political sense.
AFSCME’s support of Rossello’s federal lobbying for the Young Bill
became a political issue in Puerto Rico because the Young bill was biased in
favor of statehood, according to the legislative project’s critics. Critics of the
Young Bill stated that the bill deﬁned the Commonwealth status formula as a
clearly territorial status and, therefore, would make Puerto Rico, ofﬁcially, a
U.S. colony, embarrassing the PPD and killing its political project for Puerto
Rican autonomy. Faced with a Commonwealth-colonial status option, and
because the independence status option has had less than 5 percent following
in the last thirty or forty years, the expectation was that most Puerto
Ricans would have voted for statehood in that federally sanctioned plebiscite.
Therefore, the Young Bill was opposed by the pro-Commonwealth party, the
PPD, as well as the leftists in Puerto Rico who oppose the statehood
movement.
It is important to note that Rosselló and American-based unions denied that
the American-based unions “lobbied for statehood,” which was the accusation
that some members of the independent union movement and the opposition
party at the time, the pro-Commonwealth PPD, made against the PNP and the
AFL–CIO (Rodriguez 1998). In a controversial press article, Eduardo Bhatia,
opposition Senator of the PPD, said that AFSCME entered into a sort of titfor-tat exchange with Rosselló, where it would press for the Young Bill in return
for the unionization bill in Puerto Rico (Mulero 1998).
However, in a personal interview, Rosselló told me that AFSCME
helped him and his party lobby for the bill. Rosselló was invited to an AFL–
CIO convention in Florida where many prominent American politicians
attended, and where he could make the public case for statehood. As he
recounted:
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[W]ell, they invited me to a convention in Florida. When I spoke, as when I
speak in other conventions about my convictions, [I said] that the best situation
for Puerto Rico is the federated statehood. I spoke about it openly and I did
it to the membership. That should be in some record, it was not a secret
or anything strange. I stood up there [as I did in] the Chamber of Commerce,
the Association of Industrialists. (Roselló Gonzalez, interview by author,
Washington, DC 2002)

Therefore, Rosselló was at least placed in one key event, with AFSCME’s help,
to lobby for statehood and the Young Bill.
Second, Paul Booth, the right hand of the President of AFSCME in
Washington, D.C., told me that the PNP was offered contacts with Congressmen so that the governor could make his case for the Young Bill. Booth mentioned that the contacts were made in the form of “good references,” telling
Washington leaders that AFSCME was a “friend” of Rosselló. Therefore, the
union never went personally to Congress to represent the governor or pursue
the Young Bill explicitly but did help the governor in indirect ways (Booth,
interview by author, Washington, DC, 2002).
Other members of the PNP administration, including Senate President
Charlie Rodriguez, told me that a political exchange occurred. To him, such is
the way the political process works. When I asked him what he thought about
the opposition’s claims, namely those of PPD Senator Eduardo Bhatia, that
unions were lobbying for the Young Bill, or were somehow involved as a result
of the unionization rights bill, he said:
Eduardo Bhatia is naïve, or he wants to trick everybody that was listening to
him. . . . In the U.S. the labor movement has been actively lobbying for different causes, from ending with discrimination against minorities to, inclusively, in
favor of abortion. In other words, the labor movement in the U.S. has always
been alive, lobbying. If you go to the U.S. Congress, all unions have lobbyists
and they are continually visiting Congressmen and Senators, advocating for
their causes. They do it in municipal legislatures. They even do it in the
municipal assemblies, in the City Council of New York, inclusively. In other
words, he must either be naïve because he does not know that that happens, or
knows that it happens and is trying to trick everybody that was listening to him.
(Rodriguez, interview by author, San Juan, 2002)

For the Senate President, it was impossible to think that unions would not lobby
on behalf of the government of Puerto Rico if the government was delivering to
the unions the exclusive representation rights bill.
Furthermore, in February 13, 1998, just weeks before the unionization bill
became law, an article in El Nuevo Día ran a story that said that the U.S. Vice
President, Al Gore, lobbied in favor of the unionization bill (Mulero 1998).
According to the article, a number of Puerto Rican lawmakers were visiting
Congress with the purpose of pressuring for the Young Bill. Among the Puerto
Rican delegation were Senate President of Puerto Rico, Charlie Rodriguez, and
Senator Kenneth McClintock of the PNP. A Congressional usher called in Puerto
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Rico Senate President Charlie Rodriguez and Senator Kenneth McClintock.
They were taken to see Vice President Al Gore. Gore wanted to know how they
were going to vote on the unionization bill. Since McClintock told him that he
was still not sure, Al Gore asked McClintock to stay out of the Puerto Rico Senate
commission studying the bill. Al Gore’s request to McClintock was an important
one. Al Gore, as Vice President of the U.S., could break a tie vote in the Senate
over the Young Bill. If he was going to do that, the unionization bill must pass in
Puerto Rico. That was the message that Al Gore sent to McClintock. At that time,
Al Gore was also beginning the process of campaigning for President of the U.S.
and attempting to secure national union support, including that of AFSCME,
hence explaining his personal involvement in this matter (Mulero 1998).
In a personal communication with Kenneth McClintock I was able to corroborate this story published in the Puerto Rican press (McClintock, telephone
interview by author, New York, 2003). McClintock said that he was surprised
that such a “small fry” like him would be called by the vice president to talk
about a political matter, showing just how important the issue surrounding Law
45 must have been for labor unions in the U.S.
These “smoky backroom” deals should not surprise us. The political strategy
of AFSCME, as it has been of the American labor movement in general, has
been to “reward its friends and punish its enemies.” AFSCME did not publicly
back any status option or party in Puerto Rico, but only particular politicians
that agreed with the union in particular matters. As such, AFSCME looked for
ways to aid the governor without clearly advocating for U.S. statehood for
Puerto Rico or for the Young Bill. Through such backroom deals where national
and local politics intersected, AFSCME was able to secure spaces where the
governor’s lobbyists could advocate for the Young Bill and where AFSCME
could win votes in Puerto Rico’s legislature in favor of Law 45.
The Debate of “Labor Colonialism”
The political interventions of AFSCME were not well accepted by everyone
in the Puerto Rican labor movement. Luis Pedraza Leduc, president of the
Hermandad de Trabajadores de Services Sociales (HTSS), a bona ﬁde association that represented social workers of the Puerto Rico Department of the
Family, spearheaded the public outcry of independent labor organizations
against the new labor legislation and the American-based labor organizations
that backed the bill. He told the press that the bill put a number of restrictions
on labor activism that would make labor’s capacity to represent workers more
difﬁcult—namely the bar on strike activity. He also said that the new law would
also permit AFL–CIO afﬁliated unions to go to Puerto Rico and raid the bona
ﬁde associations’ members, because U.S.-based unions could bankroll millionaire union election campaigns for exclusive representation, while Puerto Rican
independent unions did not have those resources (Pérez 1998). He was correct.
One of the bargaining units that SPU-AFSCME was seeking to represent
included a bargaining unit of 1,200 social workers, of which over 700 were
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members of the HTSS, the bona ﬁde association led by Pedraza Leduc. According to Leduc, “a lot of money [of the AFL–CIO was] running around.” Moreover, he stated that the Puerto Rican labor movement would stop being “Puerto
Rican” if the bill was approved. To him, the unionization bill would lead to
“labor colonialism,” a takeover of the Puerto Rican union movement by what
he called “dues-sucking,” U.S.-based unions, without providing Puerto Rican
workers any substantial new beneﬁts. He also stated that given the support of
U.S.-based unions to the collective bargaining rights bill, this was a move of the
PNP administration to bring Puerto Rico closer to the U.S. and, therefore, to
statehood (Blasor 1998).
AFL–CIO leaders in Puerto Rico scoffed at Leduc’s statements regarding
“labor colonialism.” According to José La Luz, many leaders of U.S.-based
unions in Puerto Rico were partisans of Puerto Rican independence. Pedro
Grant, for example, a leftist candidate for governor in the 1970s, worked for
some AFL–CIO unions as an advisor during the public sector unionization
campaigns. José La Luz, one of the main labor leaders in favor of the unionization bill and leader of SPU-AFSCME in Puerto Rico, preferred independence
for Puerto Rico and was a member of a socialist organization, the Democratic
Socialists of America. Thus, as José La Luz told me in an interview:
Well, that old struggle between the so-called Puerto Rican unions and the
North American unions was attempted to be revived, the phenomenon that was
called “labor colonialism,” all that debate was attempted to be revived, but I
think that since many of us were leaders and activists here, in some cases of
social movements here, and in labor unions, that argument did not prosper.
. . . [S]ome of us even led the movement for disafﬁliation [from the AFL–CIO
in the 1970s] and so when you looked at that, you looked at its face, you said,
“Well, this does not make a lot sense.” (La Luz, interview by author, San Juan
2002)

Therefore, for José La Luz and other AFL–CIO leaders in Puerto Rico, their
left-wing pedigree testiﬁed to their good faith trade union agenda for Puerto
Rico. They were not labor colonialists. However, the reality was that AFSCME
raided at least one existing labor organization and, in fact, helped the prostatehood party, the PNP, in its pursuit of Puerto Rican statehood. Hence, the
accusations of labor colonialism were not completely unreasonable.
The Aftermath of Law 45
The political power of the PNP administration in the late 1990s—it controlled both houses in the legislature and the executive branch of Puerto Rico—
helped to propel Law 45 forward and be approved. Shortly after the law came
into effect, AFL–CIO afﬁliated unions began a very aggressive campaign to win
representation elections under Law 45. In the process, some Puerto Rican bona
ﬁde associations lost their hold on members, including the HTSS, which lost the
elections to SPU-AFSCME. Thereafter, conﬂicts between some independent
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unions and U.S.-based unions have increased, particularly between HTSS’ Luis
Pedraza Leduc, who now leads the Programa de Solidaridad-Union de Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica y Riego (UTIER) (ProSol-UTIER), a union
afﬁliated to the independent and militant union of electrical workers, UTIER.
ProSol-UTIER has the intent of organizing workers in the public sector, but, in
essence, it competes with U.S.-based unions for the public-sector union
members’ dues pie.
Conclusion
The jury is still deliberating as to whether the labor relations system created
by Law 45 will ever provide public-sector workers with the required leverage to
be able to negotiate collective bargaining agreements that will improve their
lives. At this point, the results of Law 45 have been dismal. As this article goes
to press, most collective bargaining agreements under Law 45, about thirty to
forty of them, have not been renewed with the government of Puerto Rico. The
government declared to be in a ﬁscal crisis in 2006 and paralyzed the negotiations of economic clauses with most of the unions under Law 45. In May of
2006, the government even laid off 100,000 public servants for two weeks. The
labor movement’s response to the layoffs was divided. SPU-AFSCME supported
the governor’s solution to the ﬁscal crisis, which included the creation of an
American-styled sales tax on goods and services, of about 7 percent. Most other
unions in Puerto Rico, including both independent and U.S.-based unions, such
as the SEIU, did not support the sales tax as they deemed it a regressive tax.
However, the sales tax was approved, the collective bargaining agreements
remained tabled, and the labor movement remains defeated and divided over
how to compel the government to negotiate in good faith and stop its regressive
policies against Puerto Rican workers.
Moreover, interunion rivalry and raiding persists. In 2004, the Federación de
Maestros de Puerto Rico (FMPR), the largest union in Puerto Rico, disafﬁliated
from the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) when it became convinced
that the per capita dues requested by the International unions were too onerous.
The membership of the FMPR voted overwhelmingly in favor of disafﬁliation
even in light of threats from the AFT to place the union under trusteeship.
Moreover, ProSol UTIER continues to seek decertiﬁcation elections against
American-based labor unions and to take back some members for the independent sector of the union movement, making any attempts to unite the labor
movement fruitless.
Recent developments in union organizing in Puerto Rico, including Law 45,
give unions and workers little reasons to rejoice. Raiding, accusations of labor
colonialism, a divided labor movement, government cutbacks, regressive tax
policies, and frozen collective bargaining negotiations have augured terribly for
the Puerto Rican working class. The private sector has already been lost to
capital, as its union density rate has been crippled to less than 3 percent.
Certainly, a solution to the present crisis requires that American-based labor
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organizations become aware of their imperial excesses and even apologize for
them. However, the situation for labor in Puerto Rico is so critical that concentrating on the imperial excesses of American-based labor organizations is simply
not enough to create a progressive, forward-looking agenda for labor. The
situation requires that unions in Puerto Rico, of all stripes—U.S.-based and
independent—supersede their divisions now to act in defense of all workers.
Only a united labor movement can confront the challenges ahead and, especially,
deter any further, botched organizing campaigns that, far from increasing labor’s
power, merely divide and conquer the workers for the bosses to continue to
wring.
César F. Rosado Marzán, Ph.D., J.D., has been a union side labor lawyer in
New York and Puerto Rico. He is currently writing a book on labor organizing
in Puerto Rico by American-based labor organizations. Address correspondence
to Cesar F. Rosado Marzán, Esq., Levy Ratner, PC, 80 8th Avenue, New York,
NY 10011. Fax: (212) 627-8182. E-mail: cfrosado.marzan@gmail.com.
Notes
1. The alliance—formally known as the Alianza Para un Nuevo Servicio Público (Alliance for a New Public
Service)—included only American-based labor organizations or unions in the process of afﬁliating to an
American “International” union: the Sindicato Puertorriqueño de Trabajadores-SEIU, Servidores Públicos
Unidos-AFSCME, the Federación Central de Trabajadores-UFCW, and the Union Nacional de
Trabajadores de la Salud, thereafter afﬁliated with the SEIU.
2. Pedro Rosselló Gonzalez was the elected governor of Puerto Rico from 1993 to 2000. His party, the PNP,
which stands in Spanish for the New Progressive Party, advocates for U.S. statehood for Puerto Rico and
approved a collective bargaining bill for public sector workers in 1998.
3. The PDP is the Spanish acronym for the Popular Democratic Party of Puerto Rico, which supports the
Commonwealth status formula for Puerto Rico and was the leading opposition party in 1998.
4. Traditional government agencies are those government agencies in Puerto Rico that depend on the Puerto
Rican government budget for their operations. “Nontraditional” government agencies, which for decades
have had their own, separate labor relations statute, locally called the “baby Wagner Act,” operate with their
own revenues.
5. The Puerto Rico Department of Labor estimates labor union and labor organization membership numbers
with a survey of Puerto Rican households. Hence, the numbers presented in Table 1 are not the actual
numbers of union members, but an estimate based on scientiﬁc polling.
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